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SOME THOUGHTS ON FICTITIOUS ENTITIES* 
Jerzy Pele 
Warsaw University 
1 FICTIONALIT Y AND LITERARINESS 
1.1 Ciraulus vitiosus in definiendo 
Literature is often characterized in terms of fic-
tionality: 
(i) those texts are defined as belonging to literature 
which refer to fictitious worlds. 
On the other hand, fictionality is often characterized 
by its occurrence in literature: 
(ii) those texts are defined as referring to a fictitious 
world which belong to literature. 
To claim both at the same time leads to a vicious 
circle. Instead, one should choose either the former or the 
former or the latter definition. 
1.2 Definitional equivalences 
The following definitions state both the necessary and 
the sufficient condition for literariness (Df.l) or fic-
tionality (Df. 2): 
Df.l. x belongs to literature = D fx refers to a ficti-
tious world; 
Df.2. x refers to a fictious world = D fx belongs to lit-
erature. 
1.3 Partial definitions 
Suppose, however, that somebody understands Ci) and 
(iil in a weaker way: 
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Df.3. If x refers to a fictitious world x belongs to lit-, 
erature; 
Df.4. If x belongs to literature, x refers to a ficti-
tious world. 
As fas as Df.l. and Df.2. are concerned, one should 
know what it is to say about x that x refers to a ficti-
tious world. And in the case of Df.2. and Df.4. - what it 
is to say about x that x belongs to literature. If he does 
not know the answers the definitions fall into the category 
of ignotum per ignotum for' him. 
J. 4 Kinds of reference in literary texts 
I am not going to accept any of the definitions given 
above, although I acknowledge that each of them contains a 
particulam veri. Certainly, expressions referring to fic-
titious entities do occur in literature and, certainly, the 
mode of their reference, in particular the fictitious one, 
does depend on their context of use. But it is far from 
clear what relation holds between literariness and fiction-. 
ality; and one reason for this is that both the concept pf 
literature and the concept of fictionality need to be made 
more precise. To analyse the former is the business of the 
theorist of literature. I shall limit myself to a few re-
marks on the latter. 
2 ON WHAT THERE ISN'T 
2,1 The term 'fictitious' with reference to extra-
linguistic entities and to expressions 
The main difference between the meanings of the term 
'fictitious'is connected with the fact that the adjective 
in question is sometimes applied to a linguistic entity 
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and on other occasions to non-linguistic ones. Thus we have 
fictional terms, sentences or texts, and, on the other hand, 
fictitious objects, events or phenomena. 
2.2 Non-existent entities 
2.2.1. Subsistence and intentionality 
When is a non-linguistic entity said to be fictitious? 
The answer found most often is: whenever the entity does 
not really exist, but, nevertheless, is being thought of, 
it constitutes an intentional object of somebody's desire, 
belief, dream, idea, etc. Some philosophers say that ficti-
tious objects do not exist but subsist only, and that ex-
istence and subsistence are two kinds of being. 
2.2.2. The kinds of non-existence 
On closer analysis, it appears that among those non-
existent entities some distinctions can be made. 
'2.2.2.1. Absolute and relative non-existence 
.An entity does not exist, in the absolute way, iff it 
has never existed and will never exist, e.g., Apollo. An 
entity does not exist at time i, in the relative way, iff 
it does not actually exist but, e.g.. Napoleon Bonaparte, 
it either existed, or, e.g., a next-week issue of a daily 
newspaper, will exist. 
2.2.2.2. Non-existent objects and non-existent events 
Individual non-existent objects and/or persons, e.g., 
a magic carpet, a carnivorous cow, can be distinguished 
from non-existent events and/or phenomena, e.g.,. and earth-
quake in Warsaw in May, 19 79, or the marriage of Hamlet and 
Lady Macbeth. 
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Notice, however, that when somebody contests the right 
of the latter to exist he does it sometimes for a different 
reason than in the case of objects. Namely he assumes that 
to exist means to be an individual object, cognizable 
through senses. If, in such a case, events, as different 
from concrete individual things, are said to be fictitious, 
fictitionsness is not opposed to being real or being factual 
but rather to being a physical object. 
2.2.3. On a classification of non-existent entities 
The two divisons presented in (.2,2,2.1) intersect to 
form the following classification of the entities which 
happen to be called, by different authors, fictitious in 
various senses of the term: 
\ENTITIES 












2 /see Table 2/ 4 /see Tables 
4 a-b/ 
Table 0: Non-existent entities 
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2.2.4. Non-existent objects 
2.2.4.1. Absolutely non-existent objects 












/1/ LOGICALLY An apple totally red and at the same 





72/ PHYSICALLY A carnivorous cow. Apollo. An apple 




/3/ PRACTICALLY The present king of France. A tar-
paulin for the Sun. 
Table 1; Absolutely non-existent individual 
objects and/or persons 
Logically possible, above, means consistent3 non-contradic~ 
tory; physically possible means in agreement with natural 
laws; practically possible means one that can he made. All 
those terms, however, should be taken cum grano salis, 
i.e.,., we should remember that they, all of them, refer to 
absolutely non-existent objects. It follows that the physic 
cal possibility of a given object does not involve the pos-r 
sibility of its coming to existence in the future. If we 
say that something, e.g. a certain object, is physically 
possible in this strange sense we mean that it is in agree-
ment with such natural laws as, for instance, the law of 
gravitation, in spite of the fact that the object under 
discussion does not exist. Only on this assumption can we 
say here that practical possibility implies physical pos-
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sibility, and the latter in turn, implies logical pos-
sibility. 
Let me make a comment on some of the examples. 
The space for practical possibility has been left 
blank and empty, because, if something is practically pos-
sible, in the sense adopted here, it may occur in the fu-
ture, and, therefore, belongs to relatively non-exsitent 
objects. 
Is the present king of France a physically possible 
non-existent object, or rather a logically impossible one? 
This depends upon the meaning we assign to the proper name 
France. If we understand by it the French territory and 
nation, then it is physically possible for France to be-
come a kingdom and for somebody to become its king; if, 
however, France is construed as the French republic, then 
the present king of France would be included in the cate-
gory of logically impossible non-existent entities. Analo-
gous arguments might be applied to the examples of physi-
cal impossibility. 
I fully realize that the examples shown in Table 1 
may appear controversial. More impoftant, however, than 
this or that way of assigning examples to the categories 
distinguished in the above table are the categories them-
selves that we have obtained as the result of our classi-
fication. Their occurrence points to the fact that many 
various kinds of thing are included in the class of abso-
lutely non-existent individual objects and, consequently, 
that different kinds of things and persons are sometimes 
called fictitious. 
2.2.4,2. Relatively non-existent objects 
Section 2 of Table 0 above consists of two categories: 
the category of past individuals and the category of future 
individuals, as represented in Table 2. 
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PAST Aristotle 
FUTURE The cathedral at Chartres in 1990 
Table 2: Relatively non-existent individual 
objects and/or persons 
2,2.5. Non-existent events 
2.2.5.1, Absolutely non-existent events 
Section 3 of Table 0, encompassing absolutely non-
existent events and/or phenomena will.be represented in 
Table 3 a-c 
ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 
LOGICALLY PHYSICALLY PRA CT. LOGICALLY PHYSICALLY PRACTICALLY 
The appoint-
ment of War-
saw in 1978 




























Table 3a: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena 
in which existent individual things and/or ~ 
persons occur 
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.WENT ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 
0 B V j e c t \ LOGIC. PHYTIC. PRAC. LOGICALLY PHYSICALLY | PRACTICALLY 
L To To To kill The meeting The meeting 
A o shave shave Sherlock of Hamlet of Sherlock 
B n the Sher- Holmes with Sher- Holmes with 
S p 
u 
I present lock - twice= lock Hol- Galdstone = 
0 c king of Hol- = /E/ mes = /F/ = /G/ 
L 0 France= me s= 
U • = /A/ = /B/ 

























- - - - - -
T 
E T To To peel That a To dissolve To feed one. 
N 
Li 
r\ shave an apple king of a a totally million per-
T X 
\J 
ri the totally republic red and to- sons with a u T king of red and - utters a tally green small total-
I M 
J. Q a repu- totally sentence apple in ly red and 
N 
D 
blic = green= in two water=/N/ totally green 




0 t. /K/ 
To To milk To milk a To keep a That Apollo 
D s P shave a carni- carnivorous carnivorous speaks Amer-
U . H Apollo= vorous - cow and to cow under ican English 






0 c at the 
B B . same time= 
J = / L / 
E n L p To wash To kill To dissolve That the pre-C 
T p R a tar- the pre- the present sent king of 
c A paulin sent king of France de-D 
C For the king of France in livers his 
T Sun=/J/ France water=/P/ speech from 
I twice=/M/ the throne 
c in American 
English=/T/ 
Table 3b: Absolutively non-existent events and/or phenomena in 




ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 







































a son of 
one's own 
daughter 
to be borr 

































































Table 3c: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena 
in which relatively non-existent objects and/or 
persons occur 
2.2.5.2. Relatively non-existent events 
Section 4 of Table 0 includes relatively non-existent 
events and/or phenomena. These can be divided according to 
what kinds of objects occur in them: existent /4a/ or rela-










The eruption of Vesuvius 
which destroyed Pompei 
To morrow's sunrise 
Table 4a: Relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena 




RELATIVELELY NON-EXISTENT ¿VENTS AND/OR PHENOM-
ENA 
PAST FUTURE 
" Ö * 
Ï » Ô 
A E I 
T X V 
I I I 
V S D 
E T U 
L E A 













The birth of 
Aristotle 
Table 4b: Relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena 
in which relatively non-existent objects and/or 
persons occur 
Please pay no attention to the examples in the tables 
above. I know that the examples are silly. And I do not 
insist on those particular that have been given. What is . 
important is the general idea reflected in the tables. The 
idea is certainly controversial, and I am fully aware of 
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the fact. Can, for instance, an event be possible in spite 
of the fact that some impossible objects contribute to it's 
occurrence? But, on the other hand, is it really impossible, 
in a kind of a so-called literary world, to peel a self-
contradictory apple? 
2.3 Fictitious entities 
As we have seen, both absolutely and relatively non-
existent po88ibilia and impossibilia, and, among them, both 
objects and events, are on various occasions considered 
fictitious. 
2.3.1. The meanings of 'fictitious1 used with reference to 
entities 
Fictitiousness is predicated of the various entities for 
a number of different reasons, which is tantamount to say-
ing that there are many opposites to the adjective ficti-
tious when if qualifies some entity. The opposites are: 
existent, actually existent, factual, being an empirical• 
object cognizable through senses, possible. 
2.3.2. Kinds of texts referring to fictitious entities 
Certainly it is not literature alone that is concerned 
witfi'fictitious entities. Philosophers speak of circular 
squares, logicians - of the present king of France, physi-
cists of an ideal gas: all these entities are absolutely 
non-existent, and at least some of them are sometimes call-r 
ed fictitious. Everyday life, with its expectations, be-
liefs, suspicions, desires, dreams, suppositions, and as-, 
sumptions, provides numerous examples of referring to non-
existent objects and events. History speaks of past events, 
scientific prognoses - of future ones: all of them are rel-
atively non-existent. It seems that there is scarcely any 
kind of non-existent entity that could be pointed to as 
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occurring solely in literature, and also scarcely any kind 
of non-existent entity that would not once be called ficti-
tious . 
2.3.3. The concept of possible world 
This being the case some scholars look for help to 
modal logics and try to use the nowadays fashionable con-
cept of possible world as the last and only resort. In-
stead of saying that fictional texts refer to fictitious 
- in one of the meanings of the term - objects or events 
they maintain that the texts have whole worlds as their 
counterparts. Some authors try to prove that fictional 
texts speak of possible worlds (Eco, 1978: 29), while some 
thers claim that the texts cannot refer to possible worlds, 
because it is characteristic of literary fictionality that 
it is directed to impossible entities (Woods, 1974: 76). 
Oddly enough, the concept of possible world - at least 
so it seems to me - had been taken by the logicians from 
nowhere else but traditional considerations on literature 
where that loose, but suggestive and vivid, metaphor of a 
poetic or literary world used to appear in discussions con-
cerning literary characters. The logicians, most probably 
following Leibniz, have subjected the traditional concept 
of imaginary world to modifications which have resulted in 
the concept, or rather concepts, of possible worlds. The 
concepts, as different from that of the poetic or literary 
world, are better adapted to special logical needs, for 
instance, to the requirements of the analysis of reasoning. 
But it does not follow that they meet equally well the 
needs of literary sciences. To answer the special purposes 
of literary-analysis the boomeranging concept of possible 
world should be redefined with these new aims in mind. Be-
fore, however, it has been done, literary theorists should 
make up their mind whether they really need a concept of 
possible world to speak of both possible and impossible 
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entities referred to in literature, and whether, they pre-
fer to have one such concept for all the different kinds 
of prose and poetry of rather various concepts, each of 
them designed for a particular kind of literature, for 
instance, one for realistic novels, another for the phan-
tastic ones. 
2.3.4. Language and the fictitiousness of entities 
To account for the variety of kinds of non-existent 
entities, when at least some of them are being considered 
fictitious, one should realize to what extent it is lan-
guage itself that imposes the distinctions between them. 
This is why, I think, we should pay attention not so much 
to the fictitious entities themselves as rather to fic-
tional expressions, or, to be more precise, to such uses 
of expressions in which they become fictional. Fiction-




Professor J. Pelc read a rather extensive lecture in our 
working group in Vienna, however since that time his con-
ception and terminology of fictionality have so fundamen-
tally changed that we can publish here the introductory 
part of his study but we have to change his original ter-
minology according to his new thesis: instead of the pre-
dicate "fictional" we have two terms: "fictitious" and 
"fictional". This change in terminology has theoretical 
reasons: "I have accepted the following terminology: 
FICTITIOUS PERSONS, THINGS, ANIMALS, and FICTIONAL 
EXPRESSIONS, SENTENCES, TEXTS." (J Pelc: Letter to Z. 
Kanyo, 15th November 1982.) Professor Pelc is working on 
